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ARTICLES
COMMEMORATING THE FORGOTTEN
INTERSECTION OF THE FIFTEENTH AND
NINETEENTH AMENDMENTS
TAUNYA LOVELL BANKS†
The women’s rights movement, throughout its history, defined its priorities with reference to white middle- or upper-class women. Thus “discrimination that affected all
women” included the right of owning property but not
[B]lack women’s voting rights.1

I. INTRODUCTION
This year we commemorate the one hundredth anniversary
of the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification.2 I use the term
commemorate instead of celebrate because it is important to
remember that this anniversary is also a time to reflect on the
lost opportunities to advance equality for all one hundred years
ago.
This reflection seems especially appropriate in a
presidential election year rife with accusations of voter
suppression.3
First, a caveat about terminology. We commonly speak of
the Nineteenth Amendment as conferring the right to vote on
†
Jacob A. France Professor of Equality Jurisprudence, Francis King Carey
School of Law, University of Maryland. An earlier version of this essay was delivered
as the keynote address at the 2020 St. John’s Law Review Symposium on the
Nineteenth Amendment, held Friday, October 23, 2020. The author thanks her
colleague Paula Monopoly for her helpful comments on an earlier version of this
essay.
1
Ronnie L. Podolefsky, The Illusion of Suffrage: Female Voting Rights and The
Women’s Poll Tax Repeal Movement After the Nineteenth Amendment, 7 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 185, 221 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
2
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
3
Jonathan Martin & Maggie Haberman, Trump Hopes to Use Party Machinery
to
Retain Control
of
the
G.O.P.,
N.Y. TIMES,
Nov.
23,
2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/us/trump-hopes-to-use-party-machinery-toretain-control-of-the-gop.html; see also TERRY SMITH, WHITELASH: UNMASKING
WHITE GRIEVANCE AT THE BALLOT BOX 135 (2020).
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women, but that is not what the actual text says. It reads: “The
right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex.”4 Any right to vote is conferred by the state, not the federal
constitution. The Nineteenth Amendment, like its cousin the
Fifteenth Amendment—which applies to race—only prohibits
states from disqualifying someone from becoming a voter due to
sex.5
What we casually call the right to vote is actually a
franchise—a privilege, that the state can choose to confer or
The Framers had a deep “distrust of direct
withhold.6
democracy.”7 They consciously chose not to include voting as a
constitutional right, instead giving the states the power to
determine voter qualifications.8 According to the United States
Supreme Court, “[s]tates . . . have broad powers to determine the
4

U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
6
See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 164 (1875) (finding the right to vote not
included in the privileges and immunities of federal citizens); see also Pope v.
Williams, 193 U.S. 621, 632 (1904) (holding that nothing in the federal constitution
confers “[t]he privilege to vote”).
7
ALLAN J. LICHTMAN, THE EMBATTLED VOTE IN AMERICA: FROM THE FOUNDING
TO THE PRESENT 18 (2018). The Jurist William Blackstone opined that:
The true reason of requiring any qualification, with regard to property, in
voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation that they
are esteemed to have no will of their own. If these persons had votes, they
would be tempted to dispose of them under some undue influence or other.
Robert Crutchfield, Abandon Felony Disenfranchisement Policies, 6 CRIM. & PUB.
POL’Y 707, 708 (2007).
8
A few scholars argue that the Supreme Court, at least during the Warren era,
treated voting as a fundamental right. See John M. Greabe, A Federal Baseline for
the Right to Vote, 112 COLUMBIA L. REV. SIDEBAR 62, 68 & n.53 (2012) (citing
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1080-81 (3d ed. 2009), which is
Dean Erwin Chemerinksy’s constitutional law text that cites several landmark cases
decided by the Warren Court); see also Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really
Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 149–50 (2008). But see, for
example, recent Supreme Court decisions upholding picture identification
requirements to vote in elections like Crawford v. Marion Co. Election Bd., 553 U.S.
181, 188–89 (2008). Also, the summary treatment by the Court of two absentee
ballot requirements for photo identification during the 2020 election seem
inconsistent with the view that voting is a fundamental right. See, e.g., Texas Dem.
Party v. Abbott, 140 S.Ct. 2015, 2015 (2020) (denying motion to expedite
consideration of a law not allowing most voters under sixty-five to vote absentee in
light of the pending election) & Merrill v. People First of Alabama, No. 20A67 (a fiveto-four decision staying a lower court decision blocking restrictions requiring that
voters provide a photo identification card with their absentee ballot, and have the
ballot signed by two witnesses or a notary public.). Some scholars concede this point.
Douglas, supra, at 144–46 (conceding that courts do not always treat restrictions on
voting as fundamental rights issues).
5
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conditions under which the right of suffrage may be exercised,
absent of course the discrimination which the Constitution
As one scholar notes, the decision not to
condemns.”9
constitutionalize the vote, consigning voter qualifications to the
individual states, “reinforced the established view of the time
that the vote, however essential to a popular government, was
not a natural right but a privilege conferred by government and
subject to constitutional and statutory limitations.”10
In commemorating the one hundredth anniversary of the
Nineteenth Amendment it is important to note that the quest for
women’s first-class citizenship, which I define as equal
participation in all aspects of the American political process, has
not been achieved. While white women have greater access to
the franchise than non-whites, they are not necessarily
considered political equals on the ballot. Legal scholar Reva
Siegel points out that fifty years after ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment “women . . . were barely represented in
Congress or the courts,” and state laws containing gender-based
restrictions were still valid.11 Further, African Americans,
women, and men, as well as other non-white individuals,
continue to be denied unfettered access to the franchise.12
In addition, any discussion of the Nineteenth Amendment
must be contextualized by mentioning the Fifteenth Amendment.
That Amendment became one hundred and fifty years old in
2020.13 Thus, in this Article the focus is on the expansion of the
franchise to include women, especially African American women.
In this Essay I explain how the histories of the Fifteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments are inextricably intertwined, and why
both amendments continue to face stiff resistance many years
after ratification. Mississippi, for example, did not ratify the
Nineteenth Amendment until 198414 and in 1997 Tennessee
9

Lassiter v. Northampton Co. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959).
LICHTMAN, supra note 7, at 16–17.
11
Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the
Family, 129 YALE L.J.F. 450, 473 (2020).
12
See GILDA R. DANIELS, UNCOUNTED: THE CRISIS OF VOTER SUPPRESSION IN
THE UNITED STATES (2020).
13
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
14
19th
Amendment
By
State,
NATIONAL
PARK
SERVICE,
https://www.nps.gov/subjects/womenshistory/19th-amendment-by-state.htm
[https://perma.cc/7N67-CF64] (last visited Mar. 4, 2021). The Nineteenth
Amendment was ratified by thirty-six states. Maryland, a border state, initially
rejected the amendment, not ratifying it until 1941. Eight other states ratified the
Amendment more than two decades later (Virginia in 1952, Alabama in 1953,
10
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became the last eligible state to ratify the Fifteenth
Amendment.15
At the beginning of the nation access to the franchise was
generally limited to property-owning or tax-paying white males,
who constituted about six percent of the population.16 By the
1830s, most states had eliminated their property-ownership
requirements, but still largely limited suffrage to white men.17
By 1856 universal, albeit, white men’s suffrage was becoming a
reality.18 Thus, in one sense expanding voting access in 1870 to
include Black men, and in 1920 to include women, was consistent
with the general broadening of the franchise, and the shift from a
republic form of government to a more participatory democracy
model. Nevertheless, as I explain in this Essay, public sentiment
and legal mechanisms impeded access to the franchise for each
group. In some cases, even a constitutional amendment was
insufficient protection. African American women and men, and
many poor white women, for example, had to wait until the 1965
Voting Rights Act before formal biased impediments to voting

Florida and South Carolina in 1969, South Carolina, Georgia in 1970, Louisiana in
1970, North Carolina in 1971 and lastly Mississippi in 1984). Id. Thus, southern and
border states remained opposed to extending the franchise to women.
15
Gregory Watson, Tennessee and the U.S. Constitution’s 15th Amendment,
TENN. STAR (Sept. 10, 2018), https://tennesseestar.com/2018/09/10/tennessee-andthe-u-s-constitutions-15th-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/Y4BQ-442N]. In addition to
Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware “(former slave states not covered by
the Reconstruction Acts) rejected the amendment, as did Ohio, initially, and
California and Oregon. New York rescinded its ratification.” D. Grier Stephenson,
Jr., The Supreme Court, the Franchise, and the Fifteenth Amendment: The First
Sixty Years, 57 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 47, 52 (1988). Ratification by southern states was
obtained because the Reconstruction Act required ratification “as a condition for
readmitting the Confederate states and seating their delegate[es].” Id. at 50.
16
Expansion of Rights and Liberties – The Right of Suffrage, Online Exhibit:
The
Charters
of
Freedom,
NAT.
ARCHIVES,
July
6,
2016,
https://web.archive.org/web/20160706144856/http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/chart
ers/charters_of_freedom_13.html.
17
The Expansion of the Vote: A White Man’s Democracy, U.S. HISTORY: PRECOLUMBIAN TO THE NEW MILLENNIUM, https://www.ushistory.org/us/23b.asp
[https://perma.cc/2RZJ-6PEJ] (last visited Mar. 4, 2021).
18
Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth and
Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971, 1993 (1994). In the early nineteenth
century only five states (Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Delaware, and
Kentucky) mandated white-only suffrage by law. See also LICHTMAN, supra note 7,
at 17.
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were removed.19 Further, voter suppression efforts continue
today.20
II. THE 1830S: BECOMING WOKE
Most discussions of the women’s suffrage movement start
with the 1848 Seneca Falls women’s rights conference. In this
Part, I start a decade earlier and discuss how the legal status of
white women and free African American women and men in the
1830s foreshadowed the woman suffragist movement.
A.

The Legal Status of Free African Americans

According to Johns Hopkins historian Martha Jones, there is
no consensus about the status of free Black people during the
antebellum period, specifically regarding whether they were
considered citizens before the Dred Scott decision.21 Jones
concludes that “the only consensus that emerges is one about the
importance of fixing” their status.22 While free Black activists
born on American soil considered themselves citizens, “they did
not agree about whether the state might affirm that fact.”23
Confirming their citizenship status was important because
“[c]itizenship . . . would protect free black people from
As citizens, they would not face possible
expulsion.”24
deportation, or even statelessness.25
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in the 1857 Dred Scott case
(Scott v. Sandford) confirmed free Black Americans’ worst fears.
While citizenship for white women was assumed, “with the
hindsight of eight decades . . . [Taney] believed [that] citizenship
for free blacks was unthinkable to the framers in 1787 because it
was unthinkable to him in 1857.”26

19

Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
See Robin Levinson-King, U.S. Election 2020: Why it Can Be Hard to Vote in
the U.S., BBC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-202054240651 [https://perma.cc/AJ85-YBPR].
21
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 403 (1856); see also MARTHA S. JONES,
BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENS: A HISTORY OF RACE AND RIGHTS IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 11
(2018).
22
JONES, supra note 21, at 11.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 4.
25
Id.
26
David Skillen Bogen, The Maryland Context of Dred Scott: The Decline in the
Legal Status of Maryland Free Blacks 1776–1810, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 381, 411
(1990).
20
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Prior to the Dred Scott decision there was not much
discussion of the meaning of citizenship and the rights and
privileges accorded citizens. “[N]ot all antebellum Americans
saw the relationship between rights and citizenship in the same
way.”27 For some, being a citizen was a “gateway to rights.”28
Citizenship, while a prerequisite in most states for voter
eligibility, did not ensure voting rights. During that era “to be
deprived of the vote did not mark one as a noncitizen;
unpropertied men, women, and children were citizens even
though in some jurisdictions ineligible to vote.”29
On the other hand, “exercising rights was [important]
evidence of citizenship.”30 Political activities like voting were
evidence of citizenship.31 In the 1830s, most free African
Americans were “[u]nable to make the laws that regulated their
Free African
communities . . . [and] governed their lives.”32
Americans still experienced overt anti-Black racism. There were
“ ‘legal
disabilit[ies]’:
exclusion
from
militia
service,
naturalization, suffrage, public schooling, ownership of real
property, office holding, and courtroom testimony.”33
Black Americans linked the notion of legal rights to the idea
of privileges and immunities of citizenship.34 To be a citizen
meant access to “[p]olitical rights—the vote, jury service, office
holding . . . one key to winning lasting equality.”35 In questioning
their citizenship status, free Black activists also saw a connection
between their own legal disabilities and the anti-slavery
movement. “They reasoned that free Black people would be
barred from full equality as long as slavery persisted. . . . To
oppose slavery, to fight for its downfall, was to protect one’s
freedom, and work for the liberty of family and friends.”36 As a

27

JONES, supra note 21, at 11.
Id. Supreme Court Chief Justice Roger Taney in Dred Scott v. Sanford noted
that white women although considered citizens and a part of the political
community, shared no political power, and thus could not vote. 60 U.S. 393, 422
(1857).
29
JONES, supra note 21, at 5.
30
Id. at 11.
31
Id.
32
MARTHA S. JONES, VANGUARD: HOW BLACK WOMEN BROKE BARRIERS, WON
THE VOTE, AND INSISTED ON EQUALITY FOR ALL 18 (2020).
33
JONES, supra note 21, at 3.
34
Id.
35
JONES, VANGUARD, supra note 32, at 20.
36
Id. at 45.
28
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result, some Black activists joined with radical abolitionists to
press for the immediate end of African enslavement.37
According to Jones, early abolitionists believed that the
enslavement of African Americans would not end quickly and
therefore did not focus on existing anti-black bias.38 In contrast,
the radical abolitionists were “committed to changing the hearts
and minds of Americans by ‘moral suasion,’ . . . until the national
tide turned forever against slavery.”39 They pushed for the
immediate end of slavery and “assumed the equality of Black and
white Americans.”40 Most Blacks in the North sided with this
branch of the abolition movement.41
Black women’s suggestions were unwelcomed at these
political meetings, leading some women to express their ideas
about “equality and dignity that citizenship promised” in print.42
Maria Miller Stewart of Boston, for example, “forged her public
identity, starting in print and then moving to the podium. She
was the first American woman to address an audience of both
men and women on politics.”43 This event occurred “[l]ong before
women’s conventions became regulation occasions.”44
Other Black women in the 1830s, like “Sarah Mapps
Douglass and Philadelphia’s Female Literary Association[,] used
their pens as weapons when they gently rivaled the city’s men.”45
There also was Mary Ann Shadd Cary, an early Black feminist,
who started the Provincial Freeman.46 Most of these women were
educated, or seeking better education.47 A few others came from
more modest backgrounds like the formidable orator, Sojourner
Truth, a formerly enslaved woman unable to read.48
37

See id. at 46.
See id. at 44.
39
Id. “The radical abolitionist movement was born in the early 1830s.” Id. at 43.
40
Id. at 44.
41
See id. at 45.
42
Id. at 20.
43
Id. at 29. Ultimately Stewart was forced to “retire” from public speaking
resorting instead to print. Id. at 33. Jones writes that Stewart “knew that her ideas
were unwelcome and that her audacious challenge to the authority of men was out of
bounds.” Id.
44
Id. Stewart “knew that her ideas were unwelcome and that her audacious
challenge to the authority of men was out of bounds.” Id. at 33. In 1833 she was
forced to “retire” from public life. Id.
45
Id. at 34.
46
ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR
THE VOTE, 1850–1920, 20 (1998).
47
Id. at 16–19, 36. See JONES, VANGUARD, supra note 32, at 36.
48
TERBORG-PENN, supra note 46, at 15–16.
38
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Unsurprisingly, some white women were attracted to the
abolition movement because they too lacked full equality. Their
plight is outlined in the next Part of this Article.
B.

The Legal Status of Free White Women

In many ways the status of white women, considered citizens
in the 1830s and 1840s, was not much better than that of free
African Americans. Martha Jones writes:
[w]hite women saw their own oppression in the plight of
enslaved African Americans. As persons who were legally
disabled by laws of marriage, property holding, and inheritance,
white women saw slavery as analogous to their own condition.
Women, they argued, were owned by men, without rights or the
capacity to act by way of individual will. Thus, they suffered
under the slavery of sex.49

Some modern scholars consider white womens’ analogizing their
plight to the enslavement of African Americans as trivializing
slavery.50 Feeling like you are enslaved is quite different, on
many levels, from being enslaved. It is important to remember,
however, that the ideals of freedom and equality were linked
with “specific calls for citizenship and enfranchisement. . . . A
belief in ‘freedom’ and ‘emancipation’ constituted the ideal
toward which the critics of many forms of oppression were
striving.”51
Many middle-class and affluent white women, awakened by
their improved educational opportunities, were attracted to the
political movements of the late 1830s and early 1840s.52 They
longed to participate in the political life of America, but the social
49
Id. at 46. See generally ANA STEVENSON, THE WOMAN AS SLAVE IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICAN SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2019). Stevenson writes:
“From its very beginnings, discourses of slavery and tyranny were at the center of
how the women’s rights movement conceived of its imperatives.” Id. at 214 (citing
David Brion Davis, Declaring Equality: Sisterhood and Slavery, in WOMEN’S
RIGHTS AND TRANSATLANTIC ANTISLAVERY IN THE ERA OF EMANCIPATION 5
(Kathryn Kish Sklar & James Brewer Stewart eds. 2007)).
50
Stevenson concedes: “It is challenging to reconsider the woman-slave
analogy as an analytical or theoretical approach because the logic that informed it
was deeply racist and irrevocably flawed.” Id. at 34.
51
Id. at 214 (citing Ellen Carol DuBois, Ernestine Rose’s Jewish Origins and the
Varieties of Euro-American Emancipation in 1848, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND
TRANSATLANTIC ANTISLAVERY IN THE ERA OF EMANCIPATION 280 (Kathryn Sklar
and James Brewer Stewart eds. 2007)).
52
See JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage
for the Voting Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 103, 131 (1994).
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mores of the time frowned on women speaking in public.53 A few
women became active in the abolitionist movement, and “[t]he
abolitionist crusade taught . . . [them] to speak in public, to
organize a petition drive, and perhaps most important, to apply
the language of natural rights to the question of human rights.”54
Rosalyn Terborg-Penn writes: “The early woman suffragists who
grew out of this abolitionist movement were radical in their
attempts to oppose gender conventions by moving outside of the
so-called women’s sphere and acting independently in calling for
their rights.”55
Similarly, many early African American women abolitionists,
like Sarah Remond, Sarah Mapp Douglass, and the Forten
sisters—Sarah, Margaretta, and Harriett—were educated, freeborn, northern activists.56 They too were attracted to the notion
of equality and suffrage for all due to their experience with
sexual and racial inequality.57 They used the skills they learned
about political organizing and speaking “to oppose racism, and
then took even more risky tactics to oppose sexism . . . [fighting]
both types of oppression, simultaneously.”58
As a natural byproduct of their activism, women, white and
Black, pushed for leadership positions within antislavery
societies.59 They faced resistance. In 1840, when women secured
leadership in the American Anti-Slavery Society, many men who
Black women
had been active in the organization left.60
supported the move to gain leadership positions, but while four
white women were elevated to the society’s highest ranks, the
sole Black woman candidate was not.61 Racial bias might explain
the loss.
Martha Jones writes:
It took courage to be an antislavery woman. Some risked their
reputations, challenging those who thought the politics of
abolitionism was men’s business. Others risked the charge of
53
Black women, for example, participated in Black political movement but were
“expected . . . to assist with building the community while also remaining
subordinate.” JONES, VANGUARD, supra note 32, at 19.
54
ELNA C. GREEN, SOUTHERN STRATEGIES: SOUTHERN WOMEN AND THE WOMAN
SUFFRAGE QUESTION 6 (1997).
55
TERBORG-PENN, supra note 46, at 20.
56
Id. at 16–19; JONES, VANGUARD, supra note 32, at 36.
57
See TERBORG-PENN, supra note 46, at 19–20.
58
Id. at 20.
59
JONES, VANGUARD, supra note 32, at 53.
60
Id. at 57.
61
Id. at 58.
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overstepping by fueling the national strife over slavery’s future.
Those who left the confines of their homes, churches, or
women’s circles encountered ridicule.62

The consequences for Black women might be especially severe.
“Black women abolitionists endured a litany of risks, and
racist violence [that] marred their public lives, even as teachers
or churchgoing women.”63 One particularly chilling example
occurred in May 1838 at an interracial meeting in Philadelphia
to establish a national women’s antislavery organization.64 On
the second day of the meeting, at an evening session where the
well-known abolitionists William Lloyd Garrison and Angelina
Grimké Weld were scheduled to speak to a crowd of three
thousand, the attendees were met by a white mob outside the
Pennsylvania Hall, which assaulted several African Americans
as they left the meeting.65 “[T]he mob was especially provoked by
the presence of Black women.”66 When those in charge of the
meeting refused to exclude Black women, the mob set the hall on
fire.67
Many of the women active in the antislavery movement were
also interested in advancing the rights of women. Thus, there
was some overlap in membership and goals. The next Part of
this Essay briefly explains the alliance between the radical
abolitionists and the burgeoning woman suffragist movement.
III. 1848–1869: THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT
From the beginning, advocates of women’s suffrage also
faced hostility. The famous 1848 Seneca Falls women’s rights
conference that marked the formal beginning of the woman
suffragist movement was lambasted as “The Hen Convention.”68
The participants were described by “[o]ne newspaper
writer . . . as ‘divorced wives, childless women, and some old
maids.’ ”69 James Mott, the husband of abolitionist Lucretia

62

Id. at 47.
Id.
64
Id. at 49–53.
65
Id. at 51.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 52.
68
ELEANOR CLIFT, FOUNDING SISTERS AND THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT 13
(2003).
69
Id.
63
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Mott, chaired the convention because the sight of a woman chair
would have been considered “too scandalous.”70
While African American abolitionist Frederick Douglass‘ was
at the convention, there is no official record of attendance by
other Black women or men.71 Notwithstanding the sexism within
the abolition movement, Douglass openly supported women’s
suffrage.72 In fact, that same year, Douglass, then president of
the National Convention of Colored Citizens, added “the issue of
women’s rights . . . [at its meeting in Cleveland, Ohio] to the
convention’s agenda, though it was not an easy fit.”73 At the
convention suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton joined with
Douglass in “making the case that the right to participate in
government is a fundamental principle of equality, from which
all other rights would flow.” Douglass and Stanton prevailed, but
by a small majority.74
African American women because of their gender and race
appreciated the close connection between both causes. They
joined white suffragists like Susan B. Anthony and Lucretia Mott
in the push for universal suffrage—all women and men.75
Unfortunately, the role of Black suffragists in the quest for the
Nineteenth Amendment was largely erased from the movement’s
history as recorded by white suffragists like Stanton, Anthony,
and other white suffragists.76 So too was the role that race
played in the quest for women’s suffrage.
70
LISA TETRAULT, THE MYTH OF SENECA FALLS: MEMORY AND THE WOMEN’S
SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1848–1898, at 13 (2014).
71
TERBORG-PENN, supra note 46, at 14 (speculating that African American men
and women may have attended the convention, despite their absence from the
official records kept by white suffragists). Tellingly Martha Jones writes: “Black
women did not attend the Seneca Falls convention. They were not barred or
excluded. . . . On those meeting days . . . the Black women of Seneca Falls were
elsewhere.” JONES, VANGUARD, supra note 32, at 63.
72
TERBORG-PENN, supra note 46, at 14.
73
JONES, VANGUARD, supra note 32, at 65.
74
CLIFT, supra note 68, at 14.
75
Neale McGoldrick, Women’s Suffrage and the Question of Color, 59 SOC. ED.
270, 270 (1995).
76
In the 1880 Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. Anthony, along with
Matilda Joslyn Gage, began writing what would become the first of volume of the
History of Woman Suffrage. TETRAULT, supra note 70, at 112. Stanton, “who was
never an ardent abolitionist” recast the influence of the abolitionist movement on
the woman’s suffrage movement depicting the former as “outrageous[ly]” hostile to
women’s rights and the woman’s suffrage movement arose “as a necessary break
with abolition.” Id. at 122. In contrast, Lucy Stone argued that the woman’s suffrage
movement in the United States and England has its origins in the 1840 World’s
Anti-Slavery Convention. Id. Martha Jones writes that the six-volume history
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In many respects, the mid-nineteenth-century coalition
between suffragists and abolitionists was a pragmatic alliance
reflecting their similar goals. The linkage between woman
suffrage and abolition seemed more compatible to some white
women suffragists like Anthony, than for others like Stanton.77
Members of both movements wanted equality, and each thought
that political rights—a seat at the table—were key to winning
lasting equality.
A few scholars, however, see the alliance between radical
abolitionists and woman suffragists differently. Law professors
Catherine Powell and Camille Gear-Rich argued that this
alliance was “more than merely one of political convenience,”
rather, it was an alliance that “embodie[d] a shared conceptual
vision as well. . . . [This vision] fused the principles of the
American Revolution concerning representation with ‘the radical
egalitarianism’ of the abolition movement.”78 There is probably
some truth in both views.
The Civil War interrupted, and ended, the first-generation
woman suffrage movement.79 After the war, the controversy over
the citizenship status of African Americans, free or enslaved,
created by the Dred Scott decision,80 and its reversal by the
Thirteenth Amendment,81 provided an opportunity to reconsider
the nation’s social contract. African Americans and white women
viewed the debates on the Reconstruction Amendments as one
such opportunity. Unfortunately, the alliance between the
woman suffragist and abolitionist movements proved too fragile.
The next Part of this Essay discusses why the coalition fell apart.
IV. THE POST–CIVIL WAR FIGHT FOR SUFFRAGE
With the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment formally
emancipating all formerly enslaved people of African ancestry,
the question of their citizenship status remained to be

“relegated Black women to the margins.” JONES, VANGUARD, supra note 32, at 10.
Later historians relying on this text repeated the omission. Id.
77
TERBORG-PENN, supra note 46, at 22–23. Terborg-Penn writes that Stanton,
although an abolitionist, was more concerned with woman’s suffrage. Id at 23.
78
Catherine Powell & Camille Gear-Rich, The “Welfare Queen” Goes to the Polls:
Race-Based Fractures in Gender Politics and Opportunities for Intersectional
Conditions, 108 GEO. L.J. 105, 141 (2020).
79
TERBORG-PENN, supra note 46, at 23.
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See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
81
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII.
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determined.82 In a sense these newly recognized Black citizens
were in the same position as white women: citizens without
political rights.83 Thus, a quest for full citizenship rights,
including the right of suffrage, seemed a unifying goal for both
groups.84 The rupture between the suffragists and former
abolitionists was caused, in part, by debates over the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments.
After emancipation, African American and white women saw
the suffrage issue differently. For African American women
suffrage was a “collective, not an individual possession.”85 Black
women and men pushed for suffrage. The quest for suffrage was
a communal endeavor. Thus, access to the vote for Black males,
but not women, was accepted as a pragmatic compromise, a first
step. It was better for the whole African American community
that one group in the membership had access to suffrage.86
Universal suffrage remained especially important to Black
women, who saw the vote as a means of securing civil rights for
all African Americans.87 While some whites in the woman
suffrage movement continued to support universal suffrage,88
other suffragists saw the reconsideration of the Nation’s social
contract as an opening for women’s rights. Journalist Eleanor
Clift writes that at the end of the Civil War suffragists had made
“[a] deal . . . with President Lincoln to push for woman suffrage
. . . [and the deal] collapsed when Lincoln was assassinated.” 89
The proposed Fourteenth Amendment provided an
opportunity for both groups to push for a constitutional right to
vote, or at the very least, universal suffrage.90 At least one
version of the proposed amendment included a provision for
universal suffrage.91 In the end, however, there was no reference
82
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to Black or woman suffrage in the Fourteenth Amendment. The
only mention of suffrage is found in the second clause of that
Amendment dealing with determining the apportionment within
the House of Representatives.92
After ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment without any
expansion of suffrage, some Black and white women’s suffragists
continued to push for expansion of the Amendment to include
universal suffrage. In 1871, for example, suffragist Victoria
Woodhull, speaking before the House Judiciary Committee,
argued, unsuccessfully, that women have the right to vote under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.93
Congress resisted, and Supreme Court decisions undermined
their efforts.
In 1873, the Supreme Court, in the Slaughter-House Cases,
quickly narrowed the scope of the Amendment limiting scope of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause94 to federal, as opposed to
state legal rights.95 Then in 1875, the Supreme Court, in Minor
v. Happersett, ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
grant women the right to vote.96 A year later the Court, in
United States v. Cruikshank, further clarified Minor, ruling that

Representatives. Signers of this petition included Stanton, Anthony, and
members of the former Women’s Loyal National League, Ernestine Rose,
Lucy Stone, and Antoinette Brown Blackwell. This exceptional combination
of signatures represents some of the period’s foremost advocates for
suffrage and abolition.
Universal Suffrage, CENTER FOR LEGISLATIVE ARCHIVES (June 25, 2019),
https://www.archives.gov/legislative/features/suffrage [https://perma.cc/S4DMGN29].
92
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (emphasis added). In other words, enslaved African
Americans would be counted for representation purposes as three-fifths of a person.
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TETRAULT, supra note 70, at 56–59.
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“the right to vote” is not a necessary attribute of national
citizenship.97
When it became clear that the nation was not prepared to
adopt women’s suffrage, white suffragists divided over whether
to support Black men’s suffrage embedded in both the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.98 Many early suffragists
were abolitionists, but their opposition to Black enslavement did
not necessarily mean that they considered Black people as
political equals. Prominent suffragists and former abolitionists
like Stanton and Anthony of the American Equal Rights
Association (formerly the Woman’s Rights Association) opposed
Black men’s suffrage unlinked from women’s suffrage.99 Anthony
proclaimed: “I will cut off this right arm of mine before I will ever
work for or demand the ballot for the negro and not the
woman.”100 Stanton made similar racists remarks saying “she
did not believe ‘in allowing ignorant negroes and
foreigners . . . [to] make laws for her to obey.’ ”101
There were attempts in Congress to include within the
Fifteenth Amendment a prohibition of discrimination based on
sex as well as race.102 This issue divided the Republicans.103
Some Republicans opposed including sex, arguing that male only
suffrage “was justified by intrinsic differences between men and
women.”104 Others found that linking women’s suffrage to that of
Black men’s suffrage would jeopardize the bill.105
Republicans were generally supportive of granting African
Americans the vote, but some saw voting as severable from office-
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100
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ANTHONY: THE WOMAN WHO CHANGED THE MIND OF A NATION 183 (1928)).
101
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Congressional Globe, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 708 (1866). Republican Sen.
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States.” Id.
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Nina Morais, Note, Sex Discrimination and the Fourteenth Amendment: Lost
History, 97 YALE L.J. 1153, 1155–58 (1988).
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(unpublished article), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3317813.
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holding.106 Thus, voting per se did not necessarily result in
gaining a seat at the political table. In fact, there was a heated
debate about whether constraints on Black office-holding were
needed to ensure passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.107 In the
end the Amendment passed the Senate conference committee
without such a limitation.108
After ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment prohibiting
the denial of suffrage to Black males, some Black and white
suffragists remained committed to universal suffrage. White
suffragist Mary Olney Brown even “outlined a legal argument for
the enfranchisement of Black women under the Fifteenth
Amendment . . . [since the language] did not explicitly exclude
women.”109 This was one of many attempts by some white
suffragists to repair the fractured coalition that existed after the
Civil War.110
Still other woman suffragists were more pragmatic,
reasoning that “the nation would only accept one reform at a
time.”111 As Black intellectual and political activist W.E.B.
DuBois argued, Black leaders understood that “[t]he nemesis of
every forward movement in the United States is the Negro [sic]
question.”112 These white women were consoled by others that if
franchise rights were conferred on Black American men, who
were lower on the social scale, then women’s suffrage would be
forthcoming.113
Those suffragists unwilling to postpone woman suffrage
broke from the American Equal Rights Association resulting in
its demise. In 1869 the woman suffrage movement split into two
camps, the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA),
headed by Anthony and Stanton, which strongly opposed the
exclusion of women in the two reconstruction amendments; and
the American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA), headed by
Lucy Stone, which supported universal suffrage, and was “willing

106
Paul Finkelman, Original Intent and the Fourteenth Amendment: Into the
Black Hole of Constitutional Law, 89 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1019, 1026–27 (2014).
107
Matz, supra note 104, at 44-45.
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to temporarily support Black [men’s] suffrage alone while the
opportunity for success existed.”114
The Fifteenth Amendment, however, did not result in
widespread Black enfranchisement in fact. There was a brief
period of access to the ballot following ratification of the
Amendment, followed by an “era of disenfranchisement of [B]lack
men by legalisms and by terror.”115 Ironically, Black
disenfranchisement in the South accompanied “an era which saw
increasing support for the enfranchisement of [white] women.”116
In the late 1880s, according to historian Elna Green, lawmakers
in the South briefly considered enfranchising white women to
counter potential Black male voters, “but only if
enfranchisement . . . would
provide
a
foolproof—and
constitutional—guarantee of white supremacy.”117 The effort
proved unnecessary when Congress repealed several federal
Reconstruction-era laws enacted to protect Black male voters.118
While the suffragist movement continued, Black and white
suffragists proceeded on increasingly separate tracks. With the
rise of an ideology of white supremacy as reflected in Jim Crow
laws and practices throughout the country, Black women were
increasingly denied a voice in white suffragists organizations.119
In some southern states Black women were excluded from the
organization all together.120 Black women started their own
Black
organizations whose goals were much broader.121
suffragists pushed for
women’s suffrage and the reenfranchisement of Black men in the South.122 Thus, the
“women’s organizations in the [early twentieth century], like
their nineteenth-century predecessors, remained largely
segregated.”123 The next Part of this Article discusses the final

114
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push for the Nineteenth Amendment and the racial overtones of
the political debates.
V. 1890–1920: THE RESTORATION ERA
AND THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT
By the end of the Nineteenth Century public sentiment for
woman suffrage was growing. A few states, primarily in the
west, already allowed women unrestricted access to the vote.124
In 1890 the two branches of the woman suffrage movement
merged into the National American Woman Suffrage Association
The organization’s goal was a constitutional
(NAWSA).125
White
amendment extending the franchise to women.126
suffragists in the North and South supported what they called
“educated suffrage,” which would restrict the vote to women who
could read and write English.127 “Educated” suffrage” would
effectively deny the franchise to Blacks and poor whites in the
South, where illiteracy rates were high.128
In counterpoint, also in 1890, Henry Cabot Lodge introduced
a Federal Elections Bill designed to provide “federal supervision
of all phases of registration and voting in national elections if 100
people within any given congressional district requested federal
intervention.”129 Because the bill would have applied nationwide,
it attracted critics from the North and South.130 The real goal,
however, was to attack election fraud targeting southern Black
male voters.131
The Federal Election Bill would have
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strengthened existing federal legislation designed to protect the
Black vote.132
Unsurprisingly, the bill did not pass, but southern states, in
anticipation of federal oversight, “engag[ed] in the systematic
and ‘legal’ disenfranchisement of African-Americans and poor
whites, amending their constitutions and adopting laws that
would render the bill largely nugatory.”133 Legal scholar Franita
Tolson writes that the defeat of the Federal Elections Bill “was
followed by the repeal of most of the Reconstruction-era
legislation in 1894 after the Democrats regained control of
Congress.”134 The former southern confederates, now largely
Democrats, were “restored” to power.
By the early twentieth century some leaders within the
woman’s suffrage movement openly espoused granting white
women the vote to offset the Black male vote.135 The racist and
xenophobic sentiments of many in the NAWSA were exemplified
by a 1903 resolution passed by the organization, noting that
“there were more white native-born women who could read and
write than all Black and foreign-born voters combined, so that
‘the enfranchisement of such women would settle the vexed
question of rule by literacy, whether home grown or foreign.’ ”136
Thus, the main goal of many suffragists was obtaining the vote
for native-born white women.
This sentiment was echoed in elite law journals137 and
Congress. As one commentator recently wrote:
[I]n many ways, the 19th Amendment was a debate about the
15th Amendment, which decreed that a citizen’s right to vote
could not be “denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.” On a swelteringly hot June day 100 years ago,

132
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senators invoked states’ rights, their hatred of the 15th
Amendment and their desire to keep African Americans from
the polls as reasons to oppose the Susan B. Anthony
Amendment.138

Nevertheless, from the 1890s to ratification “Black women
and Black men . . . remained in the woman suffrage movement
throughout the struggle, fighting both racism and sexism
simultaneously.”139 Again, this was a pragmatic alliance. If
woman suffrage was legalized, then Black women and men in the
North might use their collective political power to restore the
vote to southern Blacks.
“As women’s suffrage movement gained momentum [again]
in the 1900s, some Southern congressmen introduced measures
to repeal the Fifteenth Amendment.”140 Black women understood
that any rights conferred by Nineteenth Amendment also
depended on the continued validity of the Fifteenth Amendment
as they were denied access to the vote because of their gender
and race. So Black suffragists stressed the importance of both
Amendments.
Even when woman suffrage was not the issue, debates about
any extension of the vote were framed by the continued
resistance of southerners to both the Fifteenth Amendment and
the Black vote. During the debates in 1911 on the Seventeenth
Amendment, providing for the popular election of U.S.
Senators,141 Southern Democrats tried unsuccessfully to amend
the Elections Clause of Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1, of the
Constitution which delegates to the states, without relinquishing
total congressional responsibility, “[t]he Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections” for members of Congress.142
Next, the Democrats attempted, again unsuccessfully, to end
any federal oversight in Senate elections.
Proposing an
amendment, the so-called “race rider,” Democrats did not
specifically mention the partial repeal of the Fifteenth
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Amendment, but they made their intent clear.143 In the words of
one Republican Senator:
Not content with the success obtained in suppressing the negro
vote through a curious variety of State constitutional provisions
and legislative devices. . . . The adoption of the [race rider]
would give substantial though limited national sanction to the
disenfranchisement of the Negroes in the Southern States. In
their disenfranchisement we now passively acquiesce . . . some
Senators are not content; they ask us to actually strip Congress
of the power to question election methods and actions . . . and
the Nation . . . consent to the permanent suppression of more
than a million votes at elections to choose Senators.144

Resistance to the Black vote continued during the debates on
the Nineteenth Amendment. Senator James K. Vardaman from
Mississippi, an opponent of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments, won his office on a campaign promise to repeal the
Fifteenth Amendment.145 Vardaman advocated “wip[ing] away
federal provisions for equal protection, due process, and voting
rights . . . to stop the ‘Black peril.’ ”146 When his direct measures
did not pass, Vardaman tried to use the woman suffrage
movement to accomplish his purpose by proposing a
“compromise: the repeal of Black voting rights in exchange for
women’s suffrage.”147
As an alternative, Vardaman supported Elizabeth Cady
Stanton’s Equal Rights Amendment, “add[ing] a new clause: ‘but
in all other respects the rights of citizens to vote shall be
controlled by the state where they reside,”148 that permitted the
disenfranchisement of black voters by whatever means. In other
words, supporting woman suffrage at the expense of Black
suffrage. Although Vardaman’s effort failed, nineteen of the
Similarly,
sixty-seven senators voted for his proposal.149
Mississippi’s other senator, John Sharp Williams, proposed to
insert the word white before woman in the Nineteenth

143
Terry Smith, Reinventing Black Politics: Senate Districts, Minority Vote
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144
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145
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Amendment.150 The Senate rejected this proposal by a vote of
forty-four to twenty-one.151
South Carolina Senator Ellison “Cotton Ed” Smith, was more
direct, “thunder[ing] ‘the southern man who votes for the Susan
B. Anthony Amendment votes to ratify the Fifteenth
Amendment.’ ”152 He and other white southerners feared the
federal government might, with the technical enfranchisement of
Black women in the South, feel compelled to finally enforce,
again, the Fifteenth Amendment.153 In the end, the Nineteenth
Amendment was passed by Congress, and ratified by the
requisite number of states.154 In 1929, the Supreme Court ruled
in Leser v. Garnett that the Amendment had been
constitutionally established.155
Historian Martha Jones echoes the conclusion of other
scholars that “[t]he historical relationship between African
American men and [w]hite suffragists created bitter sentiments
among many Blacks that had not yet subsided.”156 While white
suffragists were unsuccessful in securing woman suffrage
through the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Black
women viewed these Amendments as advancements for their
race. Thus, “the suffrage struggles of [B]lack women and men
become connected.”157
The struggle to vote after ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment continued for Black women. They realized that
constitutional amendments offered little protection when “so
much about voting rights depended upon state law and the
discretion of local officials. . . . [m]ore than anything, [ratification
150
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of the Nineteenth Amendment] marked a turn: Black women
were the new keepers of voting rights in the United States.”158
The next Part of this Essay briefly discusses this point.
VI. THE AFTERMATH
Months before ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment,
the NAWSA dissolved, becoming the League of Women Voters,
which focused on voter education.159 Once again the woman
suffragist movement split, with some advocates satisfied that
their goal had been accomplished. Others continued the struggle.
As some feared, the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment
did not result in a dramatic increase in women voters.160
Fewer women than men voted in the post-1920 elections.161
A study in the early 1940s of the eight southern states attributed
part of the problem to the poll tax where, in states like Alabama,
two men were registered for every one woman.162 The study
suggested that the difference in voting rates had more to do with
sexist laws and women’s perilous economic position than lack of
After ratification of the Nineteenth
interest in politics.163
Amendment, for example, many white women in the Southfound
the poll tax an obstacle to exercising the franchise.164 Registrars
refused to accept payment from white women, and others
eliminated ballots cast by women under the pretext that they had
not paid their taxes.165 Southern Black women were burdened
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not only by the poll tax requirement, but also by outright racial
discrimination by local officials.166
There was little effort by the existing power structure of the
time to change this system, especially after the Supreme Court,
in a 1937 case, Breedlove v. Suttles, refused to strike down a poll
tax exempting all women who did not register to vote, relying in
part on the separate sphere arguments used to justify the
exclusion of women from politics.167 According to legal scholar
Rogers Smith, the Georgia “law obviously rewarded women for
not voting and gave husbands an incentive to discourage their
wives’ political interests.”168
As with the fight for woman’s suffrage, there was no
consensus among the coalition of women who attacked the poll
tax about long-term goals. Some women only wanted to repeal
the tax.169 Others saw the repeal effort as one aspect of the
larger movement to “improve conditions for women” or even
broader, advocacy for women’s civil rights.170
Initially, middle- and upper-class white women composed the
bulk of the anti–poll tax movement.171 Black club women like
Mary Church Terrell of the National Association of Colored
Women (NACW) and Mary McLeod Bethune of the National
Council of Negro Women (NCNW) worked with the white-led
National Committee to Abolish the Poll Tax (NCAPT) to remove
the tax.172 But these women largely worked separately because,
like in past movements, integrated groups of women supporting
abolition of the poll tax were often harassed.173

166

Gidlow, supra note 157, at 443. One registrar in Oklahoma resigned when a
Black woman tried to register. Id.
167
302 U.S. 277 (1937). The Petitioner, a poor white man, cleverly challenged
the constitutionality of the poll tax based on gender (citing the Nineteenth
Amendment) and poverty (citing the Fifteenth Amendment). Id. at 280.
168
Podolefsky, supra note 1, at 195 (citing Rogers M. Smith, “One United
People”: Second-Class Female Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1
YALE J.L & HUMAN. 229, 280 (1989). Further, leading up to the ratification of the
Eighteenth Amendment, political forces like the brewing and liquor industries
“engage[d] in election fraud and bribery . . . of various state referenda” to thwart
woman’s suffrage because of the close association between the temperance and
woman’s suffrage movements. This attempt to undermine woman’s suffrage
continued for decades after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment. Id. at
200–01.
169
Podolefsky, supra note 1, at 209.
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 222.
173
Id. at 223.

2020]

THE FORGOTTEN INTERSECTION

923

Sexism and racism operated separately and in tandem to
discourage joint public efforts among the women.174
Some white women’s groups attempted to distance themselves
from the race-baiting they saw as an obstacle to their campaign.
In a move sadly reminiscent of the early suffragists, some
attempted to soothe white supremacist fears with reassurances
that removal of the poll tax would help white women and not
increase the Black vote.175

Nevertheless, the movement influenced many states to
repeal their poll tax laws, and by 1964 only four southern states
had such laws.176 In that year the states ratified the TwentyFourth Amendment, which prohibits “conditioning the right to
vote in federal elections on payment of a poll tax or other types of
tax.”177 That Amendment, however, did not reach state and local
elections. Then, a year later, despite the sweeping provisions of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress resisted outlawing use of
the poll tax in state elections.178
Finally, in 1966, the Supreme Court struck down Virginia’s
poll tax law in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, overruling
Breedlove.179 Tellingly, the plaintiffs, four women and one man,
were all African Americans.180 The plaintiffs in Harper described
the “impact of poverty on women as a class and on women of color
in particular:” the intersection of gender, class and race.181 But
by 1966, “[t]he poll tax had outlived its economic
effectiveness . . . . [S]heriffs were more often disenfranchising
African Americans by refusing to accept payment” of the tax.182
VII. CONCLUSION
Terborg-Penn writes that in the end “the struggle for
suffrage among African American women was different from that
of white women and African American men, because racism did
not limit white women and sexism did not limit African
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American men.”183
After ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment many white women, but few African American
women, gained access to the franchise.184 Some well-known
white suffragists, like Alice Paul, were unsympathetic to claims
of Black women about their disenfranchisement in the South.185
In 1964, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote in Reynolds v.
Sims that “the right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s
choice is . . . the essence of a democratic society, and any
restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative
government.”186 Yet, in this country race and a “decentralized,
federalist approach to voting rights has led to a self-perpetuating
system of voting inequality” that disproportionately impacts
African Americans because of a distinct anti-black bias.187
Throughout the twentieth century, and into the twenty-first
century, voter suppression and disenfranchisement efforts
continue to target Black voters—women and men—because of
their race, not their sex. State and federal courts, including the
United States Supreme Court, participated in this effort.188
That same year Fannie Lou Hamer, a civil rights advocate
from Mississippi, and part of the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party (MFDP), challenged the seating of the regular
delegation from the state at the Democratic National Convention,
arguing that they had been selected without any in-put from
Black Mississippians.189 Her testimony before the Credentials
Committee was broadcasted live on national television.190
A working-class, rural Black woman, Mrs. Hamer testified
about the economic hardship she experienced when she tried to
register to vote; and about the physical and sexual violence she
suffered for attempting to register other Black voters.191 Her
testimony recalled the experiences of Black women decades
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earlier.192 President Johnson, viewing the televised proceedings,
abruptly called a press conference to draw attention away from
her powerful testimony, but Mrs. Hamer’s full testimony was
considered so newsworthy that it was rebroadcast later for the
world to see.193 The 1965 Voting Rights Act was signed into law
fourteen months later.194
More than forty years after Mrs. Hamer’s testimony this
country elected Barack Obama, an African American man, as
President for two terms. In 2020, the country elected Kamala
Harris as the first woman and African American Vice President.
Both candidates were elected with the overwhelming support of
Black voters.195 There has been symbolic progress. Nevertheless,
the persistence of contemporary voter suppression efforts
targeting African Americans illustrate the continued resistance
to first-class citizenship for African Americans.
For many Black women, the anniversary of the Nineteenth
Amendment is not important. Martha Jones explains that
“[Mrs.] Hamer never spoke of the Nineteenth Amendment the
way she did of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Yes,
she was a woman. But she did not see the terms of the
Nineteenth Amendment—the one that constitutionalized
women’s voting rights—as protecting her.”196
The fight for a seat at the political table continues. As Mrs.
Hamer said in a 1971 speech, “Nobody’s free until everybody’s
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free.”197 Until universal suffragist is a reality, and not merely a
legal technicality, no one is free. Mrs. Hamer’s words are a
challenge to us all.
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